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1. RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
1.1 Research background 
Hungary, as member of the European Union has become a part of a well-
organized and developed financial system. The domestic financial supervisory 
authority (HFSA and later MNB) has to face with much more sophisticated 
requirements and expectations then before. The requirements of the European 
Union are mainly based on the principle of an integrated financial market, 
which requires a harmonized regulation and a convergence in the methods of 
financial supervisory activity.   
The requirements of the European Union are mainly present in the 
following activities: 
a) MNB is present at the EU working groups and committees, which 
are responsible for developing new EU directives and regulations, or to 
modify current legislation, therefore MNB may have a direct influence on 
the future regulatory framework, 
b) MNB has the right to issue supervisory decrees and to make 
suggestions to modify domestic legislation, and is actively involved in 
preparation of Hungarian laws, Government decrees, therefore MNB has 
a substantial role in the implementation of EU legislation in Hungary, 
c) MNB prepares its own internal regulation and methodologies based 
on the standards prepared and issued by EU supervisory authorities (EBA, 
ESMA, EIOPA, ESRB), 
d) MNB is responsible for licensing the establishment of credit 
institutions, and this license gives the possibility for domestic credit 
institutions to provide cross-border financial services or to establish 
branches in other EU Member States (based on the principles of internal 
market and passporting),  
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e) MNB is the member of the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS), which gives a special role to MNB regarding the 
supervision of cross-border financial groups on a consolidated basis and 
common decisions. 
 
The system of an integrated internal market makes necessary for the 
financial supervisory authorities of Member States to closely co-operate in the 
preparation of the legislative basis and also in the daily supervisory activity. 
According to the Lamfalussy procedure, which originally belonged only to the 
capital market, but has been activated for banking and insurance supervision 
as well, the supervisory structure has been already formulated, with the aim to 
strengthen the regulatory and supervisory convergence in the Member States. 
This kind of convergence procedure is explicitly required by the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD) and Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), 
which are meant to implement the Basel III guideline, issued by the Basel 
Committee for Banking Supervision on a European level. 
 The main aim of the regulatory and supervisory convergence is the better 
co-operation between financial supervisors and the integration of regulation 
and supervision. The establishment of the banking union, and especially the 
nomination of the European Central Bank as a Single Supervisor of the most 
important credit institutions in banking union countries, has been an important 
step to achieve this goal.  This convergence procedure on a longer terms may 
lead to an establishment of a single and integrated supervisor for all financial 
sectors, including banking, capital market and insurance. Although currently 
there are many obstacles to set up such a supervisory body (for example the 
differences in supervisory structures, as in some member countries the sectoral 
supervisory authorities are integrated, in others are separated), but on a longer 
term these procedure may lead to a fully integrated, single supervisory 
mechanism in the European Union.   
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However, other challenges exist for the Hungarian financial supervisor, as 
there are some credit institutions in Hungary, which are subsidiaries of a non-
European bank. While EU directives are quite short-spoken about the co-
operation with financial supervisors from third countries, this kind of co-
operation may not be neglected, as these subsidiaries are handling large 
amounts of deposits and investments of their clients.  In order to ensure the 
safety of these funds, MNB must establish well developed co-operation 
agreements with third country financial supervisors as well. 
The legislative framework for the activity of credit institutions is a 
significant and well-emphasized part of the internal regulation of the EU. The 
first attempts to create a common legislative framework are dated back to the 
70s. The current legislative framework contains not only the basic rules, but 
gives a very detailed system of requirements, which are not only implemented 
in laws but also in Ministry of Finance or supervisory decrees.  More and more 
requirements are regulated by EU Commission Regulations, which are directly 
enforceable in Member States, and there is no need to issue a national 
regulation to implement the EU requirements. 
Although it is clear that the EU legislative framework for credit institutions 
is quite substantial, but there are still many differences at national level in the 
regulation and supervisory methods of Member States. As an important step 
towards a more integrated financial market, the European Union according to 
the Lamfalussy procedure1 has firstly created the so called Level 3 Committees 
(CEBS, CESR, CEIOPS, which were later transformed into the ESAs). These 
Committees were aimed to be the most appropriate form to develop new 
legislative and methodology proposals in the area of financial and capital 
markets. These proposals and methodologies, may be based on existing 
                                                          
1 FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN ON THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN 
SECURITIES MARKETS, Brussels, 15 February 2001, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-
wise-men_en.pdf 
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directives and can be used by all supervisory authorities in the Member States. 
Another important step was to give a higher importance and more weight for 
the directly enforceable regulations, which give much less room for Member 
States for divergent procedures. The convergence procedure in the internal 
market covers not only the legislative framework, but also the supervisory 
methodology.   
Currently, the EU internal financial market is mainly dominated by 
complex cross-border financial groups, the activity of which covers banking, 
investment, insurance and pension services, and are actively present in many 
Member State at the same time. Such complex financial groups required the 
review of the co-operation between national financial supervisors. This has a 
clear importance not only at EU level, but also globally, however, the 
legislative structure of the European Union gives the possibility to create a 
much more detailed way of co-operation then an a global basis. Even though 
there is an intention for close co-operation on a global level, the tools and 
procedure of co-operation is much better developed between EU Member 
States.   
The main aim of this paper is to summarize and overview the evolution of 
co-operation, to explain the main reasons of the development procedure, how 
to comply with existing challenges, and how to solve the problems the current 
system is facing with. The research covers also what this co-operation means 
in the daily work of MNB and what kind of developments it requires. 
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1.2 Research objectives and assumptions 
The main objective of the dissertation is to overview the development of 
the system of international co-operation between financial supervisors on a 
global and European basis, to summarize its current structure, to analyze the 
main features of the co-operation and to give proposals to improve the current 
system of co-operation. In order to achieve this aim, the guidelines of the Basel 
Committee, the legislation of the European Union and the methodology papers 
and guidelines of the EU institutions, which are responsible for supervisory 
convergence have been reviewed.  
It has been also the aim of the research, that after reviewing and 
summarizing these documents, and taking into account my personal experience 
in this field, to summarize the main problems of the current international co-
operation system and to give proposals in order to solve the problems. The 
European System of Financial Supervison is currently in a very fast 
development process (establishment of ESAs, banking union etc.) and it is 
clear that this development process has not yet finished. While the most 
important element of the current reform is the creation of a Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, there may be even more possibilities to achieve a better 
functioning co-operation. 
There are still many important questions regarding the banking union, 
especially that how effective answer this can be for the current problems of 
financial supervision. This question is also relevant as Hungary shall make a 
decision whether to join the banking union as a non-eurozone country. The 
research examines what kind of achievements the banking union means 
compared to the previous supervisory co-operation system, and what kind of 
challenges it has to face with in order to be a better way of co-operation. One 
of the main aim of the research is to give concrete proposals whether Hungary 
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should join the banking union and what kind of steps could be taken to 
strengthen and develop the current framework of the banking union.  
Hungary has to take into account many pros and cons when deciding about 
to join the banking union, in order to take the most adequate decision.  This 
decision will definitely has an effect for the whole economy of the country, as 
a developed, well-regulated and supervised, safe banking system is an essential 
condition of economic growth. The research also aims to summarize and 
analyze these pros and cons. 
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2. CO-OPERATION BETWEEN EU FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISORS 
The main reason why this issue is actual, that the system of international 
co-operation of EU financial supervisors is under a very fast development 
procedure. Groupe de Contact, which was established in 1972, was the most 
appropriate and suitable forum of supervisory co-operation for 30 years during 
the financial market conditions of those years. In 2004, when CEBS was 
established, it was already clear, that this will be only a transitional solution 
towards an EU supervisory authority. In 2011, with the establishment of EBA, 
this authority has been given much more power regarding the development of 
supervisory co-ordination, harmonized legislative framework and supervisory 
convergence. In 2014, when European Central Bank has been nominated as a 
single supervisor in EU, it became even more evident, that the supervision of 
cross-border groups must be taken into account EU level reasons, rather than 
national level. Even the dates of these steps gives a signal, that the structural 
changes in the EU supervisory framework has been accelerated, and this is the 
only way to keep in steps with the innovation and challenges of the financial 
sectors.  
During the research, my 20 years of practice in the field of financial 
supervision has been used and also my experience as member of several EU 
working groups and committees2.  
To complete the research I studied the relevant EU directives, regulations, 
technical standards and the guidelines of CEBS and EBA, which are related to 
the issue of supervisory co-operation. I also read the relevant guidelines of the 
Basel Committee. I examined the literature of the topic, also expert views and 
the speeches of leaders of institutions, which plays an important role in 
                                                          
2 I was the Hungarian member to Groupe de Contact, EGPR and SCREPol, and also alternate 
member to EBA Board of Supervisors, between 2011 and 2013. 
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international supervisory co-operation. I have discussed this subject with many 
employees of the MNB, who takes part in the daily work of the supervisory 
colleges or EU working groups. 
During the preparation of my research, I tried not only to summarize the 
available information, but also to give a correct evaluation of the actual 
situation using also my personal experience on this subject, and to give 
possible solutions for the problems arised. 
 The need for international co-operation between financial supervisors has 
been acknowledged already 50 years ago, however, by that time, the 
regulations and the institutional framework did not support to achieve essential 
developments. Many important events has happened since then (for example 
the failure of Herstatt, BCCI, Lehmann Brothers, Northern Rock), which 
reflected the need of more detailed co-operation. 
Globalization became relevant not only regarding the activity of credit 
institutions, but the whole financial supervision became global. The direct 
consequence of the international extension of large financial groups was the 
globalization of supervisory activity and created closer links between 
supervisors. 
The integrated internal market and the relevant legislative framework of 
the EU gives even more possibility to improve the effectiveness of supervisory 
co-operation. The procedure, which has been started with the establishment of 
the Groupe de Contact, and lead to a single supervisory mechanism in the 
banking union, also shows the ability of the EU regulation to improve. While 
in the past the legislators needed decades to take the necessary decisions, there 
was only two years between the announcement of the banking union and the 
starting of its operation. The developments in the institutional framework of 
financial supervision had to keep in steps with financial innovations on the 
market, which was crucial to maintain financial stability in the EU. 
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The establishment of CEBS showed that co-operation must be carried out 
on a daily basis, and convergence is required not only in the field of regulation 
but also in supervisory methods. Using the practical experiences from the 
operation of CEBS, EBA has been created as an EU supervisory authority, 
which is actively involved in the preparation of an EU level legislative 
framework. While the establishment of EBA clearly had a positive impact on 
improving the safety of the EU banking system, but there are still some 
possible ways to improve the effectiveness of its decision making procedures 
and internal operations. 
 Even in the current framework there are still obstacles for effective 
supervisory co-operation, which are worth to examine as many of them still 
remains in the banking union. ECB must come over these obstacles to be able 
to ensure that single supervisory mechanism is really more effective compared 
to national solutions.  
This paper examines those pros and cons which must be taken into account 
while deciding if a non-eurozone country should join the banking union. The 
discrimination in the decision making system, the lack of access to common 
resolution and crisis management funds, and liquidity facilities creates a 
situation, in which the positive factors of joining to banking union currently 
may not compensate for the transfer of national supervisory and resolution 
powers. For non-eurozone countries, it can be reasonable to wait with the 
joining to banking union, while in the meantime the detailed rules of the 
operation of the banking union may be changed in a way that this should be 
more convenient for a non-eurozone country to join. 
The establishment of the banking union may in itself has a negative 
consequence on the structure of international financial groups. The single 
supervisory mechanism may give more incentive to transform subsidiaries into 
branches. If this happens, MNB will have much less supervisory power to 
influence the domestic operation of international groups.  
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This paper gives concrete proposals on how the EU financial supervisory 
structure could be improved, in order to keep the EU level interests as the main 
driver of decision making and to create more clarity in the responsibility of 
decision makers. 
The EU should focus not only on the co-operation between national 
supervisors of Member States but also on the co-operation with third country 
supervisors. Prudential regime of third country branches is not harmonized yet, 
there are many divergences between the practice of Member States. The lack 
of a harmonized approach may lead to a presence of a market participant, 
which activity is not effectively regulated.  This would have a negative effect 
on the level playing field. 
The acceleration of the development in recent years does not mean that the 
structural and regulatory reforms has reached to the end. Based on practical 
experiences there is still room for improving the effectiveness of the EU 
financial supervisory co-operation framework. Negative consequences may 
arise if the development of the supervisory framework will be behind the 
innovations on the financial markets. EU politicians and supervisory experts 
have a clear responsibility in determining the proper way of further 
developments. 
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3. RESULTS 
3.1 Last 40 years of international co-operation between 
financial supervisors 
The dissertation summarizes the development of the co-operation of 
financial supervisors both on global and EU level. The importance of this kind 
of co-operation was first recognized 40 years ago, and the developments have 
been accelerated in the last decade. In order to better understand the main 
features of the problems in the field of international co-operation, it has been 
worth to summarize how this co-operation began and how it developed in the 
last 40 years. Looking at the developments, it is easy to recognize that the 
system of international co-operation between financial supervisors, has always 
been adjusted to better reflect the actual developments on financial markets. 
These main developments included the globalization, the importance of 
consolidated supervision, the need for cross-sectoral solutions and principle 
based supervision, and most of all, the integrated internal market of the EU. 
The best way to overview the developments on the field of international 
supervisory co-operation is to follow the guidelines of the Basel Committee 
for Banking Supervision (global level), or the directives, regulations and 
guidelines in the EU (EU level). The legal basis of international co-operation, 
especially in the EU, has been developed both on quantitative and qualitative 
basis. The quantitative developments can be recognized as the legal basis 
became more and more detailed. At the same time, while at the beginning the 
rules of co-operation have been defined in directives, which had to be 
implemented in national legislations, currently most of the requirements are 
defined by EU regulations, which are directly enforceable in Member States 
(quantitative basis).  
 
Cl
ick
 to
 B
UY
 N
OW
!PD
F-X
Change Editor
w
w
w.tracker-softw
are
.c
om Cl
ick
 to
 B
UY
 N
OW
!PD
F-X
Change Editor
w
w
w.tracker-softw
are
.c
om
14 
 
3.2 The main problems of international supervisory co-
operations, and possible solutions in EU 
There is no doubt that there is more and more need for better co-ordination 
between the national financial supervisory authorities of the Member States. 
The global financial crisis has showed that if the Member States plan to 
introduce only national measures in order to handle the crisis, that can enforce 
other Member States to take similar measures, and these measures altogether 
are rather weakening the overall EU resilience capacity to economic shocks. 
However, there are many obstacles for effective co-operation (such as 
differences in legislative basis, cultural differences, diverse supervisory 
methods, obstacles in information flow, secrecy rules, technical issues, 
differing supervisory structures, interpretation problems with directives, 
regulations or guidelines, geograpfical problems). The need for a single 
supervisory handbook and supervisory convergence has been recognized many 
years ago, however, looking at the current EU legislative framework there are 
still many ways to require higher capital from institutions at national level.  
The dissertation details all those problems, where the EU soon has to find 
the solutions, as the global crisis has already shown, that in case of a banking 
crisis, or systemic risks, which may endanger financial stability, any delay or 
not adequate measure may have an adverse effect, which is relevant compared 
to the GDP of the given country.   
There are at least to issues, which should have been solved on a fast way. 
Firstly, there is a need to ensure that EU level supervisory authorities must act 
based on the interest of the EU rather than national level. Secondly, there is a 
need for a much more effective co-operation between supervisors of different 
financial sectors, both on level of regulation and supervisory methodology. If 
the decisions of EU level supervisory authorities are mainly based on national 
interests, larger Member States have better possibilities to promote their own 
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national interests. This may have a negative incentive for smaller Member 
States to co-operate, since they have much less voting rights. The main 
objective of an EU level supervisory authority shall not be to serve the German, 
Spanish, French or UK interests but only to promote EU interests.  
There are still many sectoral divergences in case of banking, capital market 
or insurance regulation, and the current legislative framework does not ensure 
that same risks are handled in a same way in financial sectors. The European 
Central Bank, as a single supervisor, is responsible only for credit institutions, 
and financial groups lead by credit institutions. This may impose a risk that 
there is less attention on European level for regulation and supervision of 
insurance and investment firms. On a longer basis, the merger of national 
supervisors, or the creation of a single EU insurance and capital market 
supervision, similarly as banking union, may be an effective answer to these 
questions, within or outside European Central Bank. 
The EU should give much more attention to the shadow banking entities, 
because in case of these entities, not always clear, which EU supervisory 
authority has the responsibility to supervise. Although EU decision makers are 
willing to develop an effective legislative framework and supervisory system 
for shadow banking entities, but they are still far from achieving a harmonized 
and integrated system on this subject. 
 
3.3 Banking union, as a possible answer to supervisory 
challenges 
Banking union has been invented mainly by politicians, who wanted to 
ensure citizens, that they are able to give a strong response to prevent future 
financial crisis. Banking union has started its operation only a short time ago, 
and at current stage it is hard to estimate if it can fulfill the role, what the 
politicians aimed for it. The dissertation therefore summarizes, what obstacles 
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banking union has to face with, what kind of problems endanger the effective 
operation and the ability to give quick responses of the banking union, and also 
how to ensure that depositors of different Member States will be handled 
equally. 
Even at this early stage, it is clear, that banking union, and especially the 
creation of a single supervisory mechanism, may effectively decrease the 
economic dependence between Member States and banks, licensed in their 
territories. The last financial crisis has showed that this dependence intensified 
the effects of the crisis and made the Member States more vulnerable. National 
supervisory authorities became dependent from their own large sized banks, 
which incented them to try to hide the real problems, which hampered to take 
the truely effective supervisory measures. The creation of a single supervisor 
will definitely lead to supervisory convergence and harmonization of 
supervisory expectations, which gives less possibility for banking groups to 
use supervisory and regulatory arbitrage.  
However, resolution and deposit insurance element of banking union is 
quite unfinished yet, therefore they will not be able to exempt Member States 
from the financial burden of a possible future crisis for a while.  
   
3.4 Pros and cons for Hungary to decide on to join Banking 
union 
Banking union has been created mainly for eurozone countries, however, 
there is a possibility for non-eurozone countries to join. Before making a 
decision on joining the banking union, a country must evaluate the pros and 
cons carefully. The first concerns, that remaining outside the banking union 
would have a competitive disadvantage effect for Hungary, were not fulfilled, 
and there are no such trends on the international financial markets, which 
would  confirm such possible disadvantages. Because of the relatively short 
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time of being a single supervisor, the European Central Bank could not justify 
yet its ability to ensure a more effective way of supervision than previous 
systems. On a longer term, it is worth to wait while practical examples will 
show that ECB is more effective in financial supervision then the national 
supervisory authorities of Member States, and keeps itself only to the EU level 
interests. 
A Member State should transfer its resolution and supervisory rights to a 
single supervisor only if it is evident, that with this transfer the financial system 
would become more stable and the safety net of depositors becomes stronger.    
Unfortunately, the decision making system of the banking union does not 
really inspires non-eurozone countries to join banking union, as they would 
have only a limited ability to influence the decisions. In case of their 
disagreement, the only possible solution is to quit banking union, and their 
ability to rejoin will be also restricted. 
Although Hungary has not joined banking union, but is the member of 
European System of Financial Supervision, which also gives the opportunity 
to ensure that its regulation and supervisory methodology could be based on 
common European norms and the best supervisory practice, therefore opting-
out does not mean  real disadvantages on this area. 
As a summery after evaluating all pros and cons, a conclusion can be 
drawn that immediate join to banking union is not a necessary step. Although 
principally a country, which steps in at first stage may have a better ability to 
influence the internal operational rules of the banking union, but according to 
the decision making system of the banking union, this is not certainly true. 
Until the Hungarian introduction of euro, there is always a possibility to ask 
for joining, if there are essential changes in market, economic or legal 
conditions. 
The pros and cons about joining the banking union can be summarized in 
the following sheet: 
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Pros and cons about joining the banking union 
 Pros Cons 
Competition 
There is a strong supervisory and 
resolution power behind the banks in the 
banking union, which creates a 
competitive advantage 
There are no practical signals of 
competitive advantage, there is no 
pressure from Hungarian banks that 
Hungary should join banking union 
Transfer of 
supervisory powers 
The largest Hungarian institutions would 
be supervised by ECB, as a supervisory 
authority with high reputation 
Even the largest Hungarian banks may 
have less attention from ECB as they are 
not so relevant players at European level. 
The ability of Hungary to react quickly 
in a financial crisis would decrease, and 
the advantages of such transfer are not 
clear yet 
Transfer of 
resolution powers 
Decisions on resolutions are taken on EU 
level 
MNB has growing experience with 
resolution 
Taking part in 
decision making 
Decisions are taken based on high level 
competencies 
The ability to influence decisions is 
much smaller for a non-eurozone country 
National interests Priority to EU level interests 
More room for handling problems at 
national level, which can be useful in a 
crisis situation 
Reputation 
ECB has a high level reputation, which 
supports the achievement of supervisory 
aims 
ECB has a high reputation only as a 
central bank, it needs time to reach 
higher reputation as a bank supervisor 
Single supervisory 
handbook 
Domestic methodology can be based on a 
single and high quality EU supervisory 
practice 
EU single supervisory handbook can be 
achieved and used even without being 
member of banking union, but opting-out 
gives more flexibility for domestic 
solutions 
Macroprudential 
issues 
Domestic macroprudential measures can 
be better executed in other Member State 
There is less experience on 
macroprudential measures even at EU 
level 
Opting-in 
intentions of other 
non-eurozone 
countries 
If all other non-eurozone country join, it 
means a pressure to Hungary 
At least 2 non-eurozone countries will 
not join banking union 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The financial supervisory system of the European Union has gone through 
a spectacular development process in the last 50 years. In the last decade this 
development has even accelerated. The development process will surely not 
stop after the creation of the banking union, but new measures will arise. In the 
history of the European Union, in case of every meaningful financial crisis, the 
answer of EU was the strengthening of internal co-operation. 
Both regulatory and supervisory convergence gives enough room for 
further possibilities to co-operate. The recommendations, which can be drawn 
based on the historical developments, current financial environment and risks 
are the followings: 
 
1. The system of banking union should be developed, in order to give more 
incentives for non-eurozone countries to opt-in 
Such incentives could be created in many areas. The strongest incentive 
for non-eurozone countries to join, could be, if the institutional framework and 
supervisory experience of the banking union would prove, that this system is 
really a more effective way of financial supervision. If this is the case, the 
confidence of the financial markets towards credit institutions inside the 
banking union, would be significantly higher. This situation would inspire the 
banks outside the banking union to press their national governments to join. 
However, proving effective supervision needs time, and the real evidence of 
such effectiveness could be, only if banking union could give a better answer 
for a similar financial crisis as happened in 2008.  Therefore the ECB should 
focus on: 
- developing new supervisory methods to licensing and supervising 
banks, which ensure that these procedures can be carried out more 
effectively, based on EU level interests and methods, 
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- being able to discover weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the 
individual institutions and the financial system as a whole, and to take all 
necessary immediate measures in a timely manner to prevent financial 
crisis, 
- supporting the strengthening of confidence in the financial system of 
Europe, which helps the competitiveness and funding capacities of EU 
banks, 
- enforcing banks through the structure of banking union to handle the 
savings of the economy in a safe manner, and to provide credits to 
individuals and companies. 
 
However, there are many other possibilities to inspire non-eurozone 
countries to join banking union. There are two main obstacles in the current 
regime: firstly, the voting rights of non-eurozone countries are different, and 
secondly, they may not reach financial contributions from financial crisis 
management funds and ECB liquidity facilities. Both obstacles may be handled 
relatively easily by changing the rules of the regime, and to give the same rights 
for non-eurozone countries.  This could be the way, how the system would best 
serve the interests of the whole European Union. 
 
2. Significant reforms should be carried out in the management, co-
operation and decision making system of EU supervisory authorities 
Many inconsistencies can be observed regarding the management system 
of EU supervisory authorities, which cause many practical problems.  EU 
supervisory authorities has a Chair, but the main decision making body is the 
Board of Supervisors, which is organized and managed by the Chair. However, 
the Chair has no voting rights, but the Chair has to execute the decisions of the 
Board of Supervisors and to defend it at the public or against the stakeholders. 
Members of Board of Supervisors have a clear conflict of interest in many case. 
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According to the EU supervisory authorities’ regulation, they have to make 
their decisions in line with EU interests, but national interests many times 
conflicts EU interests. In order to ensure the political independence of EU 
supervisory authorities, a large part of their budget is financed by the national 
authorities, which puts more and more financial burden for national 
supervisory authorities, while EU Commission, which gives only 40% of 
financing, still has many ways to influence the work of the EU supervisory 
authorities. 
 
According to these facts, the following modifications seem to be 
necessary: 
- The financing of EU supervisory authorities should be financed fully 
from EU central budget, and the yearly budget must be in line with the growing 
scope of activity of the EU supervisory authorities, which means a gradual 
increase of budget. The pre-defined gradual increase would be important to 
avoid the possibility of political influence. EU supervisory authorities should 
have the right to makee reserves, which would help their resistance to political 
pressures. 
- The Chair and the staff should have a more important role in the decision 
making system and the management of EU supervisory authorities, which 
would reduce the conflict of interest problems. 
- Joint Committe should also have a more important role, and all issues, 
which are relevant in financial sectors should have been discussed at Joint 
Committee level. 
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3. Institutional structure of financial supervision should be reviewed, and 
coherence in the field of sectoral supervisions and regulation should be 
strengthened 
There is a clear inconsistency in the structure of EU supervision. Most of 
EU Member States have an integrated supervisory authority (banking, 
insurance and capital market supervision is carried out by the same authority, 
as MNB in Hungary), However, EU supervisory authorities are separated. In 
Hungary and in many other Member States, integrated supervisory authorities 
already proved, that even insurance and capital market supervision can be more 
effective in an integrated supervisory body. In Hungary, this integration 
happened in 1997 and 2000, gradually. There are many areas, where more 
harmonization had been achieved in the regulation of different financial 
sectors. It was also recognized that the main obstacle of further harmonization 
is the EU legislation itself, because EU was not able to create cross-sectoral 
harmonization.3 
 
Single supervisory mechanism has been created only for credit institutions 
mainly based on the following assumptions: 
a) In Europe, mainly banks were hit by global financial crisis, and Member 
States had to give financial support. As banking union is mainly a political 
intention, it is understandable, that the political answer had to concentrate on 
banks. From supervisory point of view, it is not so easy to separate banks from 
the other participants of the financial market, as in many countries – including 
Hungary as well – banks are the largest players on capital market, and many 
                                                          
3 A good example for this is the regulation of agents, where Hungary has an intention long 
time ago to harmonize between financial sectors, but in EU, the agents of banks, 
investment firms and insurance companies are regulated by three different EU directives. 
As Hungary has to implement all these directives, the domestic regulation may not be cross-
sectoral.  
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insurance companies are owned by credit institutions and belongs to large 
financial groups headed by a credit institution.  
b) The central banking activity of European Central Bank is mainly 
restricted to banks, so ECB had experience only in case of banks. Although 
there were some minor cases, when ECB had to estimate the risks of insurance 
companies from financial stability point of view, but ECB itself has no practice 
in the field of insurance supervision. It became evident, that ECB wanted to 
take over only the supervision of banks and not insurance companies. 
c) Other elements of banking union (resolution procedures and fund, 
deposit insurance) have been also invented mainly for banks. However, the 
Banking Resolution and Recovery Directive is valid not only for banks but for 
investment firms, and there is an investment protection scheme for the clients 
of investment firms (which is very similar to deposit protection).  
d) Insurance companies also have close business connections with aech 
other (for example through reinsurance contracts), just like banks (interbank 
market), however, this kind of activity of insurance companies is much better 
regulated and supervised as in case of banks. This means that in case of 
insurance companies, contagion effect is much smaller and the risk that an 
illiquidity of an insurance company may cause the insolvency of another 
insurance company is rather limited.  In case of banks, contagion effect was an 
additional negative effect of the financial crisis and regulation and supervisors 
did not pay enough attention to this risk before 2008. 
 
On a longer term, consolidated supervision can be better executed in an 
integrated supervisory authority, because it is more effective and may better 
take into account the inter-connectedness of financial sectors. Information flow 
is more effective in an integrated body, and supervisory measures may be faster 
and more adequate. The transformation of the single supervisor into an 
integrated supervisory authority may have an additional positive elements, that 
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rules and supervisory methodology would be better harmonized across 
financial sectors. This kind of transformation could also serve the idea, that the 
supervisory approach to different entities would be better harmonized, 
including those entities, which currently belong to the shadow banking area. 
An integrated supervisory authority can better serve the purpose of effective 
information flow between banking, capital market and insurance supervisors, 
and may have a closer and wider connection to the macroprudential authority. 
Even macroprudential function can be better executed if the macroprudential 
authority has to co-operate with less microprudential authorities.   
There is also a clear need for more harmonization in the field of 
supervisory measures, because currently national supervisory authorities have 
different scope of measures, which hampers the consistent supervisory actions 
against each individual members of a financial group. 
 
4. More harmonization should be achieved regarding the regulation of 
third country entities and connections with their supervisory authorities 
CRDIV has only a limited focus on the activity of third country entities, 
their supervision and connections between supervisory authorities. A 
committee or working group should be set up to overview all related questions 
and issues, and provides suggestions for the possibilities to achieve more 
harmonization in regulation and supervisory methodology.  Currently, the only 
relevant requirement is, that Member States may not give more favorable terms 
for third country branches as to branches from another Member State. 
Practically this wording gives room for different interpretations. In the absence 
of a clear and adequate regulation, third country branches may have a 
competitive advantage, which would give an incentive to third country 
financial groups to set up branches in the EU rather than subsidiaries.  
As a common regulatory minimum, these branches should be obliged to 
send regular reports to supervisors based on CRR requirements, to disclose the 
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same information as subsidiaries, national supervisors should be given the right 
to require higher capital, and a minimum dotation capital requirement should 
be set up for branches. 
Without common regulation and supervisory methods, significant market 
share can be achieved by a market player, which is out of the scope of a very 
detailed regulatory framework and sophisticated supervision. 
 
5. The immediate join to the banking union is not justified yet in case of 
Hungary 
After the thorough examination of pros and cons, a conclusion can be 
drawn that the most suitable way for Hungary in this situation is to wait for 
better conditions and for the proof that banking union is more effective than 
previous systems. After joining the eurozone, Hungary will definitely become 
a member of banking union as well, but for that time being, there has always 
been a possibility to join, if there is a significant change in the current 
conditions. 
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5. NEW AND NOVEL SCIENTIFIC RESULTS 
 
1. The system of the international co-operation of financial supervisory 
authorities has to keep in steps with the actual trends and innovations on the 
financial market. The analyses of historical events has showed, that the main 
trends in the financial sectors (such as globalization, operation in groups, 
financial crisis, and the way how risks became more and more complex) have 
an immediate effect on the system and procedures of international supervisory 
co-operation. Due to the integrated financial market, the co-operation of 
financial supervisors is even more crucial within the European Union, this is 
why supervisory structures and procedures of co-operation is much more 
detailed within the EU compared to other parts of the world. 
2. There are many obstacles of international supervisory co-operations, 
which partly mean regulatory and structural differences, but also technical 
issues. It is not enough if the European Union sets up a single regulatory 
framework for the financial sector, if related national laws still contains many 
differences and divergences. The supervision of large financial groups requires 
the co-operation of many supervisory authorities and the number of involved 
participants is even higher in a crisis management. The protection of national 
interests, differences in languages, supervisory methods and geographical 
problems are also factors, which endangers the effectiveness of a successful 
co-operation, even within the banking union.  
3. Although EU has already achieved a high quality in the co-operation of 
supervisory authorities, but this system still has many elements to be improved. 
The system of banking union should be improved in order to give more 
incentives for non-eurozone countries to join. The voting system should be 
formed in a way, which excludes the possibility for larger states to influence 
the decisions to better suited to their national interests. During this reform, 
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more emphasize should be given to further convergence regarding the 
supervision and regulation of different financial sectors. 
4. Setting up banking union has been an essential step toward a common 
supervisory framework, however, it did not give perfect solutions to all 
possible problems. There are clear shortcomings in the voting system and crisis 
management procedures. Hungary, as a non-eurozone country, has to examine 
all pros and cons before joining banking union, and the most important 
question in this decision, whether the benefits of opting-in are clearly higher 
then disadvantages. In this relatively earlier stage of banking union, waiting 
for better conditions could be the most reasonable decision, immediate join is 
not adequate.   
5. Banking union does not only creates a new regime for supervisory 
authorities, but also may have an effect on the future structure of financial 
groups. There has been already many incentives in the regulatory framework 
of the EU to transform subsidiaries into branches, but banking union gives even 
more advantages for a financial group to operate through branches. Home 
country supervisory tools becomes stronger, while host country supervisors are 
weakened. Not only solvency requirements, but also liquidity regulation gives 
more incentives to transform subsidiaries into branches. 
6. Although EU tries to achieve a single regulation for all market 
participants, but so far there is less focus on third country entities. Branches of 
third country credit institutions should be regulated on a common basis, and 
the co-operation with third country supervisors should also be reviewed.  
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6. PUBLICATION IN THE FIELD OF THE THESIS 
Publications in foreign language 
1. László Seregdi, János Szakács, Ágnes Tőrös 
Micro- and macroprudential regulatory instruments compared accross the 
European Union 
Financial and Economic Review, Vol. 14. Issue 4. pp: 57-86, (2015) 
http://english.hitelintezetiszemle.hu/letoltes/3-seregdi-szakacs-toros-en.pdf 
 
2. Seregdi László 
Basel 2010: How the Accord will change banking, Symposium 
The Financial Regulator Vol.9.1 June 2004 
 
Publications in Hungarian language 
I. Scientific books 
2015 
1. Seregdi László 
Hpt. VI. fejezet 35-57. cím, VII. fejezet 61-64. cím, 68-69. cím, IX. fejezet 73-
84. cím, XII. fejezet 113-114. cím  
In: Kommentár a hitelintézetekről és a pénzügyi vállalkozásokról szóló 2013. 
évi CCXXXVII. törvényhez (megjelenés alatt) 
Wolters Kluwer Complex Kiadó, 2015 
 
2. Seregdi László 
Bszt. XX. fejezet, XX/A. fejezet, XXIX. fejezet 
In: Kommentár a befektetési vállalkozásokról és az árutőzsdei szolgáltatókról, 
valamint az általuk végezhető tevékenységek szabályairól szóló 2007. évi 
CXXXVIII. törvényhez (megjelenés alatt) 
Cl
ick
 to
 B
UY
 N
OW
!PD
F-X
Change Editor
w
w
w.tracker-softw
are
.c
om Cl
ick
 to
 B
UY
 N
OW
!PD
F-X
Change Editor
w
w
w.tracker-softw
are
.c
om
29 
 
Wolters Kluwer Complex Kiadó, 2015 
 
2013 
3. Seregdi László 
Az Európai Unió hitelintézetekre vonatkozó szabályai és azok implementálása 
Magyarországon 
In: Lentner Csaba (szerk.) 
Bankmenedzsment: Bankszabályozás – Pénzügyi fogyasztóvédelem 526 p. 
Budapest: Nemzeti Közszolgálati és Tankönyv Kiadó, 2013, pp: 263-318 
(ISBN: 978-963-08-5591-4) 
 
4. Seregdi László 
A PSZÁF jelenlegi helyzete, szerepe, a várható, illetve indokolt változások  
In: Lentner Csaba (szerk.) 
Bankmenedzsment: Bankszabályozás – Pénzügyi fogyasztóvédelem 526 p. 
Budapest: Nemzeti Közszolgálati és Tankönyv Kiadó, 2013, pp: 401-430 
(ISBN: 978-963-08-5591-4) 
 
2011 
5. Seregdi László 
Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete  
In: Tatay (szerk.) 
A pénzügyi intézményrendszer Magyarországon 
Sopron: A Soproni Felsőoktatásért Alapítvány, Nyugat-Magyarországi 
Egyetem, 2011. pp: 314-341 
(ISBN 978-963-89173-1-7) 
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2006 
6. Seregdi László 
Az Európai Unió hitelintézetekre vonatkozó szabályai és azok alkalmazása 
Magyarországon 
In: Lentner Csaba (szerk.) 
Pénzpiacok szabályozása Magyarországon 327 p. 
Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2006, pp: 121-184 
(ISBN: 963 05 8375 5) 
 
7. Seregdi László 
A PSZÁF jelenlegi helyzete, szerepe, a várható, illetve indokolt változások,  
In: Lentner Csaba (szerk.) 
Pénzpiacok szabályozása Magyarországon 327 p. 
Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2006, pp: 271-287 
(ISBN: 963 05 8375 5) 
 
2002 
8. Huszti Ernő, Lentner Csaba, Seregdi László, Tarpataki János 
A bankok szabályozásával összefüggő irányelvek és azok magyarázata, illetve 
az EU szabályok érvényesülése a hazai bankszabályozásban 
In: Lentner Csaba (szerk.) 
Bankszabályozás 435 p. 
Sopron: Nyugat-Magyarországi Egyetem, A „Soproni Pénzügy Szakos 
Egyetemi Hallgatók Szakkollégiuma” Alapítvány, 2002. pp: 85-136 
(ISBN: 963 00 9969 1) 
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9. Huszti Ernő, Lentner Csaba, Seregdi László, Tarpataki János 
A PSZÁF ellenőrzési és bankszabályozási tevékenysége, illetve a várható 
változásai, 
In: Lentner Csaba (szerk.) 
Bankszabályozás 435 p. 
Sopron: Nyugat-Magyarországi Egyetem, A „Soproni Pénzügy Szakos 
Egyetemi Hallgatók Szakkollégiuma” Alapítvány, 2002. pp: 213-240 
(ISBN: 963 00 9969 1) 
 
 
II. Publications in scientific journals and other publications 
2015 
1. Seregdi László 
A szavatoló tőke szerepe a hitelintézetek prudenciális szabályozásában 
MNB oktatási füzet 
http://www.mnb.hu/Root/Dokumentumtar/MNB/Kiadvanyok/szakmai_cikkek/A_szavatolo_t
oke_szerepe_a_hitelintezetek_prudencialis_szabalyozasaban.pdf 
 
2. Seregdi László 
A banki belső modellek hatékonyságát teszteli az Európai Bank Hatóság 
MNB honlap 
http://www.mnb.hu/Root/Dokumentumtar/MNB/Kiadvanyok/szakmai_cikkek/a-
bankrendszer-jovoje/Seregdi_Laszlo_-
_A_banki_belso_modellek_hatekonysagat_teszteli_az_Europai_Bank_Hatosag-
_2015_januar_8.pdf 
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2014 
3. Seregdi László 
Nyitva maradt kérdések a hitelintézetek és befektetési vállalkozások 
prudenciális szabályozásában 
Hitelintézeti Szemle, 2014. 2. szám 
 
2011 
4. Seregdi László 
Az Európai Unió pénzügyi felügyeleti rendszerének szerepe a 
bankfelügyeletben és a bankszabályozásban, kihívások és lehetőségek 
Gazdasági Élet és Társadalom 2011. I-II. szám 
 
2009 
5. Seregdi László 
Úton az egységes európai felügyelet felé, együttműködés válsághelyzetben  
Ellenőrzési Figyelő 2009. 1. szám 
 
2005 
6. Seregdi László 
Pénzügyi szabályozás & jogharmonizáció – Bázel II. - Ajánlások uniós 
bankfelügyelőktől 
BANK ÉS TŐZSDE, 2005. 11. szám. 
 
2002 
7. Seregdi László 
Összevonás és felügyelet (Rovat: Szabályozás - pénzügyi jogharmonizáció) 
BANK ÉS TŐZSDE, 2002. október (40-44. szám) 
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1994 
8. Seregdi László 
Pénzügyi konglomerátumok 
BANK ÉS TŐZSDE, 1994. 27. szám. 
 
 
III. Presentations, lectures in foreign language 
1. Seregdi László 
Supervisory issues related to the review of the role of credit rating agencies 
Export Credits CWG informal meeting – Magyar EU elnökség rendezvénye 
Budapest, 2011. május 13. 
 
2. Seregdi László 
The Post-MiFID Financial World  
Split, 2007. június 15.  
 
3. Seregdi László  
Overview of the Implementation issues and challenges of the Standardised and 
Internal Ratings-Based Approaches in Hungary  
Regional Seminar jointly with the Group of Banking Supervisors from Central 
and Eastern Europe (BSCEE) and Financial Stability Institute 
Credit Risk in Basel II  
Budapest, 2005. május 10-12 
 
4. Seregdi László 
Supervisors’ role in Regulating FX Risk Management 
Hungarian Experience 
IMF Technical Assistance Mission 
Kijev, 2005. április 18. 
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5. Seregdi László 
How the HFSA prepares itself and the market participants (Basel II) 
Banking and Finance in Central, Eastern & SE Europe, Russia and the CIS 
2004 and beyond 
Szervezők: Global Association of Risk Professionals, Institute of Risk 
Management 
Brüsszel, 2004. július 6.  
 
6. Seregdi László  
Credit Risk Management in CEE  
Panel Discussion 
Interpreting Basel II on a National Level and Outlining the Steps to 
Implementation 
Prága, 2004. április 22-23. 
 
7. Seregdi László  
Asset Quality Examination in Hungarian Banks 
Supervisory Seminar in Poland on Credit Risk 
Varsó, 2002. november 21. 
 
8. Seregdi László  
The Hungarian practice on introducing the trading book and market risk capital 
requirements 
Közép- Kelet Európai Bankfelügyelők Csoportja konferencia 
Budapest, 2001. szeptember 13.  
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9. Seregdi László  
Hungarian Experiences with a Single Regulator for a Financial Industry 
National Bank of Croatia 
Zágráb, 2001. június 8. 
 
 
V.  Presentations, lectures in Hungarian language 
1. Seregdi László 
Az új Hpt., a CRD IV és CRR, ICAAP, avagy az új tőkekövetelmények és 
azok számítása a pénz és tőkepiaci szervezeteknél – az első év tapasztalatai 
Budapest, 2014. november 12. Magyar Könyvvizsgálói Kamara 
 
2. Seregdi László 
Felügyeletek közötti együttműködés 
Budapest, 2005. február 16., Nemzetközi Bankárképző Központ 
 
3. Seregdi László 
Pénzügyi csoportok összevont felügyelete az EU direktívák és a magyar 
szabályozás szerint 
Budapest, 2004. május 3., PSZÁF 
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